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Abstract—Deep Neural Networks have created a paradigm
shift in our ability to comprehend raw data in various im-
portant fields ranging from computer vision and natural lan-
guage processing to intelligence warfare and healthcare. While
DNNs are increasingly deployed either in a white-box setting
where the model internals are publicly known, or a black-box
setting where only the model outputs are known, a practical
concern is protecting the models against Intellectual Property
(IP) infringement. We propose BlackMarks, the first end-to-
end multi-bit watermarking framework that is applicable in the
black-box scenario. BlackMarks takes the pre-trained unmarked
model and the owner’s binary signature as inputs and outputs
the corresponding marked model with a set of watermark keys.
To do so, BlackMarks first designs a model-dependent encoding
scheme that maps all possible classes in the task to bit ‘0’ and bit
‘1’ by clustering the output activations into two groups. Given
the owner’s watermark signature (a binary string), a set of key
image and label pairs are designed using targeted adversarial
attacks. The watermark (WM) is then embedded in the prediction
behavior of the target DNN by fine-tuning the model with
generated WM key set. To extract the WM, the remote model
is queried by the WM key images and the owner’s signature
is decoded from the corresponding predictions according to
the designed encoding scheme. We perform a comprehensive
evaluation of BlackMarks’s performance on MNIST, CIFAR-
10, ImageNet datasets and corroborate its effectiveness and
robustness. BlackMarks preserves the functionality of the original
DNN and incurs negligible WM embedding runtime overhead as
low as 2.054%.
I. INTRODUCTION
Deep neural networks and other Deep Learning (DL) vari-
ants have revolutionized various critical fields ranging from
biomedical diagnosis and autonomous transportation to com-
puter vision and natural language processing [1], [2]. Training
a highly accurate DNN is a costly process since it requires:
(i) processing massive amounts of data acquired for the target
application; (ii) allocating substantial computing resources to
fine-tune the underlying topology (i.e., type and number of
hidden layers), and hyper-parameters (i.e., learning rate, batch
size), and DNN weights to obtain the most accurate model.
Therefore, developing a high-performance DNN is impractical
for the majority of customers with constrained computational
capabilities. Given the costly process of designing/training,
DNNs are typically considered to be the intellectual property
of the model builder and needs to be protected to preserve the
owner’s competitive advantage.
Digital watermarking has been immensely leveraged over
the past decade for ownership protection in the multimedia
domain where the host of the watermark can be images,
video content, and functional artifacts such as digital integrated
circuits [3], [4], [5]. However, the development of DNN
watermarking techniques is still in its early stage. Designing
a coherent DNN watermarking scheme for model ownership
proof is challenging since the embedded WM is required to
yield high detection rates and withstand potential attacks while
minimally affecting the original functionality and overhead of
the target DNN.
Existing DNN watermarking techniques can be categorized
into two types depending on the application scenario. ‘White-
box’ watermarking methods [6] assumes the availability of
model internals (e.g., weights) for WM extraction while
‘black-box’ watermarking only assumes that the output pre-
dictions can be obtained for WM detection [7], [8]. On the
one hand, White-box WMs have a larger capacity (carrying
multiple-bit information) but limited applicability due to the
strong assumption. On the other hand, black-box WMs enable
IP protection for Machine Learning as a Service (MLaaS) [2]
while only zero-bit watermarking methods have been pro-
posed. It is desirable to develop a systematic watermarking
approach that combines the advantages of both types of WMs.
While all present black-box watermarking papers embed the
WM as a statistical bias in the decision boundaries of the DNN
(high accuracy on the WM trigger set), our work is the first
to prove that it is feasible to leverage the model’s predictions
to carry a multi-bit string instead of a one-bit information
(existence or not of the WM).
By introducing BlackMarks, this paper makes the following
contributions:
• Proposing BlackMarks, the first end-to-end black-box
watermarking framework that enables multi-bit WM em-
bedding. BlackMarks possesses higher capacity compared
to prior works and only requires the predictions of the
queried model for WM extraction.
• Characterizing the requirements for an effective water-
marking methodology in the deep learning domain. Such
metrics provide new perspectives for model designers and
enable coherent comparison of current and pending DNN
IP protection techniques.
• Performing extensive evaluation of BlackMarks’s perfor-
mance on various benchmarks. Experimental results show
that BlackMarks enables robust WM embedding with
high detection rates and low false alarm rates. As a side
benefit, we find out that BlackMarks’s WM embedding
improves the robustness of the marked model against
adversarial attacks.
ar
X
iv
:1
90
4.
00
34
4v
1 
 [c
s.M
M
]  
31
 M
ar 
20
19
Fig. 1: Constraint-based watermarking system.
II. PRELIMINARIES AND RELATED WORK
Digital watermarks are invisible identifiers embedded as an
integral part of the host design and have been widely adopted
in the multimedia domain for IP protection [9], [10]. Conven-
tional digital watermarking techniques consist of two phases:
WM embedding and WM extraction. Figure 1 shows the
workflow of a typical constraint-based watermarking system.
The original problem is used as the cover constraints to hide
the owner’s WM signature. To embed the WM, the IP designer
creates the stego-key and a set of additional constraints that do
not conflict with cover constraints. Combining these two con-
straints yields the stego-problem, which is solved to produce
the stego-solution. Note that the stego-solution will simultane-
ously satisfy both the original constraints and the WM-specific
constraints, thus enables the designer to extract the WM and
claim the authorship. An effective watermarking method is
required to meet a set of criteria including imperceptibility,
robustness, verifiability, capacity, and low overhead [11].
IP protection of valuable DNN models is a subject of
increasing interest to researchers and practitioners. [6] takes
the first step towards DNN watermarking and embeds the
WM in the weights of intermediate layers by training the
model with an additional regularization loss. The WM is later
extracted from the weights at the marked layer assuming a
white-box scenario. [12] present the first generic watermarking
approach that is applicable in both white-box and black-box
settings by embedding the WM in the activation maps of the
intermediate layers and the output layer, respectively. To allevi-
ate the constraint on the availability of model internals during
WM extraction, several papers propose zero-bit watermarking
techniques that are applicable in the black-box scenario. [7]
craft adversarial samples as WMs and embeds them in the
decision boundary of the original model by fine-tuning the
DNN with the WMs. Null hypothesis testing is performed
to detect the WM based on the remote model’s response to
the WM query images. [13] suggest to use the incorrectly
classified images from the training data as the WM trigger
set and generate random labels as the corresponding labels. A
commitment scheme is applied to the trigger set to produce
the WM marking key and the verification key. The existence
of the WM is determined by querying the model with the
marking keys and performing statistical hypothesis testing.
[14] proposes three WM generation algorithms (‘unrelated’,
‘content’, ‘noise’) and embeds the WM by training the model
with the concatenation of the training set and the WM set.
To detect the WM, the remote model is queried by the WM
set and the corresponding accuracy is thresholded to make
the decision. To the best of our knowledge, none of the
prior works has addressed the problem of multi-bit black-box
watermarking.
III. BLACKMARKS OVERVIEW
This section demonstrates the global flow of BlackMarks
framework (Section III-A) and introduces a comprehensive set
of metrics for an effective DNN watermarking technique (Sec-
tion III-B). Potential attacks that might render the embedded
WMs undetectable are identified in Section III-C.
A. Global Flow
Figure 2 shows the global flow of BlackMarks framework.
BlackMarks consists of two main phases: watermark embed-
ding and watermark extraction. The marked DNN is deployed
as a remote service that only allows API access. BlackMarks is
the first framework that supports multi-bit DNN watermarking
in a black-box setting. We discuss the workflow of each phase
as follows.
Watermark Embedding. The WM embedding module of
BlackMarks takes the pre-trained model and the owner-specific
WM signature as its input. The output is the watermarked
DNN together with a set of WM keys. The WM signature is
an arbitrary binary string where each bit is independently and
identically distributed (i.i.d.). A model-dependent encoding
scheme is devised to map all possible labels into bit ‘0’ and bit
‘1’. The WM embedding process is performed in two steps.
First, a set of WM keys are generated as secure parameters
for WM embedding. Then, the underlying DNN is trained
(fine-tuned) such that the owner-specific WM signature is
encoded in the output activations. Note that WM embedding
is a one-time task performed by the owner before the model is
distributed. Details of each step are discussed in Section IV-A.
Watermark Extraction. To verify the IP of a remote DNN
and detect potential IP infringement, the model owner first
queries the DNN service with the WM keys generated in the
WM embedding phase. BlackMarks then decodes the owner’s
signature from the corresponding triggered predictions using
the encoding scheme employed in the embedding stage. The
Bit Error Rate (BER) between the extracted signature and the
true one is computed. A zero BER implies that the owner’s IP
is deployed in the remote DNN service. Details of each WM
extraction step are discussed in Section IV-B.
B. Evaluation Criteria
There are a set of minimal requirements that should be
addressed to design a robust digital watermark. Table I details
the prerequisites for an effective DNN watermarking method-
ology. In addition to previously suggested requirements in [6],
[7], we believe credibility and integrity are two other major
Fig. 2: BlackMarks Global Flow: BlackMarks watermarking framework has two phases. During WM embedding stage,
BlackMarks devises a model-specific encoding scheme and generates WM key pairs based on the owner’s signature. The
designed WM keys are embedded in the target DNN by model fine-tuning. In the WM extraction stage, BlackMarks queries
the remote DNN with the WM key images and decodes the owner’s signature from the model’s predictions.
TABLE I: Evaluation criteria for an effective watermarking of deep neural networks.
Requirements Description
Fidelity Accuracy of the target neural network shall not be degraded as a result of watermark embedding.
Credibility Watermark extraction shall yield minimal false negatives; WM shall be effectively detected using the pertinent keys.
Robustness Embedded watermark shall withstand model modifications such as pruning, fine-tuning, or WM overwriting.
Integrity Watermark extraction shall yield minimal false alarms; the authorship of the unmarked models will not be falsely claimed.
Capacity Watermarking methodology shall be capable of embedding a large amount of information in the target DNN.
Efficiency Communication and computational overhead of watermark embedding and extraction shall be negligible.
Security The watermark shall be secure against brute-force attacks and leave no tangible footprints in the target neural network; thus, an unauthorized
party cannot detect/remove the presence of a watermark.
factors that need to be considered when designing a practical
DNN watermarking methodology. Credibility is important be-
cause the embedded watermark should be accurately extracted
using the pertinent keys; the model owner is thereby able
to detect any misuse of her model with a high probability.
Integrity ensures that the IP infringement detection policy
yields a minimal false alarms rates, meaning that there is
a very low chance of falsely proving the ownership of an
unmarked model used by a third party. BlackMarks satisfies
all the requirements listed in Table I as we empirically show
in Section V.
C. Attack Model
To validate the robustness of a potential DL watermarking
approach, one should evaluate the robustness of the proposed
methodology against (at least) three types of contemporary
attacks: (i) model fine-tuning. This attack involves re-training
of the original model to alter the model parameters and find a
new local minimum while preserving the accuracy. (ii) model
pruning. Model pruning is a common approach for efficient
DNN execution, particularly on embedded devices. We iden-
tify model pruning as another attack approach that might affect
the watermark extraction/detection. (iii) watermark overwrit-
ing. A third-party user who is aware of the methodology used
for DNN watermarking (but does not know the owner’s private
WM keys) may try to embed a new watermark in the model
and overwrite the original one. An overwriting attack intends
to insert an additional watermark in the model and render
the original one undetectable. A watermarking methodology
should be robust against fine-tuning, pruning, and overwriting
for effective IP protection.
IV. BLACKMARKS METHODOLOGY
Deep learning models possess non-convex loss surfaces
with many local minima that are likely to yield similar accu-
racy [15], [16]. BlackMarks takes advantage of this fact that
there is not a unique solution for modern non-convex optimiza-
tion problems to embed the WM information in the distribution
of output activations within the target DNN. We detail the
workflow of WM embedding and extraction shown in Figure 2
in Section IV-A and IV-B, respectively. The computation
and communication overhead of BlackMarks framework is
discussed in Section IV-C. We use image classification as the
host problem in this paper, however, BlackMarks can be easily
generalized to other data applications.
A. Watermark Embedding
Algorithm 1 summarizes the steps of BlackMarks’ WM
embedding. BlackMarks encodes the owner-specific WM in-
formation in the distribution of the output activations (before
softmax) while preserving the correct functionality on the
original task. The rationale behind our approach is to explore
the unused space within the high dimensional DNN [17] for
WM embedding. BlackMarks formulates WM embedding as
a one-time, ‘post-processing’ step that is performed on the
pre-trained DNN locally by the owner before model distribu-
tion/deployment. The procedure of BlackMarks’s output layer
watermarking scheme is summarized in Figure 3. We explicitly
discuss each of the steps outlined in Algorithm 1 in the
following section.
Fig. 3: BlackMarks’ WM embedding algorithm.
1 Encoding Scheme Design. Recall that our objective is to
encode a binary string (owner’s signature) into the predictions
made by the DNN when queried by the WM keys. BlackMarks
designs a model- and dataset-dependent encoding scheme
that maps the class predictions to binary bits. The encoding
scheme (f ) is obtained by clustering the output activations
corresponding to all categories (C) into two groups based
on their similarity. To do so, BlackMarks passes a subset of
training images in each class through the underlying DNN
and acquires the activations at the output layer (before softmax
applied). The mean value of the output activations in each class
is then computed and gathered. Finally, K-means clustering
is employed to divide the averaged output activations of all
classes into two groups, resulting in the encoding scheme (step
1). The encoding scheme specifies the collection of labels that
correspond to bit ‘0’ and bit ‘1’, respectively.
2 Key Generation 1. The key generation module takes
the encoding scheme obtained in step 1, the owner’s private
signature (b ∈ {0, 1}K , where K is also the key length),
and the original training data as inputs and returns a set of
image-label pairs as the WM keys for the target DNN. To
be more detailed, BlackMarks deploys targeted adversarial
attacks to craft WM key images and labels. If the given
bit in b is ‘0’, the source class and the target class for the
WM image (‘adversarial sample’) are determined by uniformly
randomly selecting a class label that belongs to the cluster
‘0’ and cluster ‘1’ determined by the encoding scheme (f ),
respectively. The source class is used as the corresponding
WM key label. The WM keys for bit ‘1’ in b are generated in a
similar way. We use Momentum Iterative Method (MIM) [18]
in our experiments. BlackMarks is generic and other targeted
adversarial attacks can be used as the replacement of MIM.
BlackMarks’s objective is to design specific WM key im-
ages as the queries for model authentication instead of crafting
standard adversarial samples that cannot be distinguished by
human eyes. Therefore, the maximum perturbation is set to
 = 0.5 with L∞ norm bound. We assume that the WM
signature and the key generation parameters (e.g., source and
target classes, maximum distortion, step size and the number
of attack iterations) are secret information specified by the
owner. BlackMarks’s WM key images can be considered as a
generalization of ‘adversarial samples’ with relaxed constraints
on the perturbation level and a different objective (authenti-
cating the ownership of the DNN instead of fooling the model
to give wrong results).
It’s worth noting that the transferability of adversarial
samples [19], [20] might yield false positives of WM detection
as shown in [7]. To address this problem, we set the initial key
size to be larger than the owner’s desired value K
′
> K and
generate the input keys accordingly (K
′
= 10 × K in our
experiments). The intuition here is that we want to filter out
WM keys that are located near the decision boundaries and
can easily transfer to unmarked models.
3 Model Fine-tuning. To enable seamless encoding of the
WM information, BlackMarks incorporates an additive WM-
specific embedding loss (LWM ) to the conventional cross-
entropy loss (L0) during DNN fine-tuning where a mixture
of the WM keys and (a subset of) the original training data is
fed to the model. The formulation of the total regularized loss
(LR) is given in Eq. (1). Here, we use Hamming Distance as
the loss function LWM to measure the difference between the
extracted signature (obtained by decode predictions) and the
true signature b. The embedding strength parameter λ controls
the contribution of the additive loss term.
LR = L0+λ·LWM ( b, decode predictions(Y keyM∗ , f)). (1)
Note that without the additional regularization loss (LWM ),
this retraining procedure resembles ‘adversarial training’ [21].
All of the existing zero-bit black-box watermarking papers [7],
[14], [13] leverages ‘adversarial training’ for WM embedding
to ensure that the marked model has a high classification
accuracy on the WM trigger set. However, such an approach
does not directly apply to multi-bit WM embedding where we
care about the difference between the decoded signature and
the original one instead of the difference between the received
predictions and the WM key labels. BlackMarks identifies this
inherent requirement of multi-bit watermarking and formulates
an additive embedding loss (LWM ) to encode the WM. The
rationale behind our design is that, when queried by WM key
images, an additional penalty shall be applied if the prediction
of the marked model does not belong to the same code-bit
cluster as the corresponding WM key label (code-bit clusters
are specified by the encoding scheme).
In our experiments, we set the hyper-parameter λ to 0.5 for
MNIST and CIFAR-10 benchmark, and to 0.01 for ImageNet
benchmark. The pre-trained unmarked model is fine-tuned for
15 epochs with the regularized loss in Eq. (1) for all bench-
marks. We use the same optimizer setting used for training
the original neural network, except that the learning rate is
TABLE II: Benchmark network architectures. Here, 64C3(1) indicates a convolutional layer with 64 output channels and 3× 3
filters applied with a stride of 1, MP2(1) denotes a max-pooling layer over regions of size 2× 2 and stride of 1, and 512FC
is a fully-connected layer with 512 output neurons. BN denotes batch-normalization layer. ReLU is used as the activation
function for hidden layers.
Dataset Baseline Accuracy Accuracy of Marked Model DL Model Architecture
MNIST 99.44% K = 20 K = 30 K = 50 1*28*28-32C3(1)-BN-32C3(1)-MP2(1)-BN99.44% 99.46% 99.42% -64C3(1)-BN-Flatten-BN-512FC-BN-10FC
CIFAR10 92.09% K = 20 K = 30 K = 50 Please refer to [22].92.10% 92.28% 92.19%
ImageNet (top-1) 56.39% K = 20 K =30 K =50 Please refer to [23].56.28% 56.31% 56.36%
reduced by a factor of 10. Such retraining procedure coherently
encodes the WM key in the distribution of output activations
while preventing the accuracy drop on the legitimate data.
4 Key Generation 2. Once the model is fine-tuned with the
regularized loss in step 3, we first find out the indices of initial
WM keys that are correctly classified by the watermarked
model (denoted by IM∗ ). To identify and remove WM keys
images with high transferability, we construct T variants of
the original unmarked model (T = 3 in our experiments) by
regular fine-tuning. All these (T + 1) unmarked models are
queried to find the common indices of the initial WM keys
that are incorrectly classified (denoted by IM). Finally, the
intersection of IM∗ and IM (denoted by Ikey
′
) determines the
indices of proper key candidates to carry the WM signature.
A random subset of candidate WM keys is then selected as
the final WM keys according to the owner’s key size (K). In
the global flow (Figure 2), we merge the two key generation
steps into one module for simplicity.
B. Watermark Extraction
To extract the signature from the remote DNN (M′ ), the
owner queries the model with the WM key images (Xkey)
generated in step 4 of WM embedding and obtains the corre-
sponding predictions (Y keyM ′ ). Each prediction is then decoded
to the corresponding binary value using the encoding scheme
(f) designed in WM embedding. The decoding is repeated
for all predictions on the WM key and yields the recovered
signature (b
′
). Finally, the BER between the true signature (b)
and the extracted one (b
′
) is computed. The owner can prove
the authorship of the model if the BER is zero.
C. Watermarking Overhead
Here, we analyze the computation and communication over-
head of WM extraction. The runtime overhead of the one-time
WM embedding is empirically studied in Section V-F. For
the remote DNN service provider, the computation overhead
of WM extraction is equal to the cost of one forward pass
of WM key images through the underlying DNN. For the
model owner, the computation cost consists of two parts: (i)
decoding the prediction response Y keyM ′ to a binary vector by
finding out which cluster (‘0’ or ‘1’ in the encoding scheme f )
contains each prediction; and (ii) performing an element-wise
comparison between the recovered signature (b
′
) and the true
one (b) to compute the BER. In this case, the communication
overhead is equal to the key length (K) multiplied by the sum
of the input image dimension and one to submit the queries
and read back the predicted labels.
V. EVALUATION
We evaluate the performance of BlackMarks framework
on various datasets including MNIST [24], CIFAR10 [25]
and ImageNet [26], with three different neural network archi-
tectures. Table II summarizes DNN topologies used in each
benchmark and the corresponding WM embedding results.
In Table II, K denotes the length of the owner’s signature
(which is also the size of the WM keys). In the rest of this
section, we explicitly evaluate BlackMarks’ performance with
respect to each requirement listed in Table I. As empirically
demonstrated, BlackMarks is effective and applicable across
various datasets and DNN architectures.
A. Fidelity
Fidelity requires that the accuracy of the target neural
network shall not be significantly degraded after WM embed-
ding. Table II compares the baseline DNN accuracy (Column
2) and the accuracy of marked models (Column 3 and 4)
after WM embedding. As demonstrated, BlackMarks respects
the fidelity requirement by simultaneously optimizing for the
classification accuracy of the underlying model (the cross-
entropy loss), as well as the additive WM-specific loss as
discussed in Section IV-A. In some cases (e.g. WideResNet
benchmark), we even observe a slight accuracy improvement
compared to the baseline. This improvement is mainly due
to the fact that the additive loss LWM in Eq. (1) act as a
regularizer during DNN training. Regularization, in turn, helps
the model to mitigate over-fitting by inducing a small amount
of noise to DNNs [27].
B. Credibility and Robustness
BlackMarks enables robust DNN watermarking and reliably
extracts the embedded WM for ownership verification. We
evaluate the robustness of BlackMarks against three state-of-
the-art removal attacks as discussed in Section III-C. These
attacks include parameter pruning [28], model fine-tuning [29],
and watermark overwriting [6].
Model Fine-tuning. Fine-tuning is a type of transformation
attack that a third-party user might use to remove the WM
information. To perform such an attack, the adversary retrains
the distributed marked model using the original training data
with the conventional cross-entropy loss (excluding LWM ).
Table III summarizes the impact of fine-tuning on the water-
mark detection rate across all benchmarks. As can be seen
from the table, the WM signature embedded by BlackMarks
framework can be successfully extracted with zero BER even
TABLE III: BlackMarks’s robustness against model fine-tuning attacks. The key length is set to K = 50.
Dataset MNIST CIFAR-10 ImageNet (top-1)
# Fine-tuning Epochs 20 50 100 20 50 100 5 10 20
Accuracy 99.46% 99.48% 99.51% 92.34% 92.36% 92.40% 55.19% 55.13% 55.17%
BER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Detection Success 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TABLE IV: BlackMarks’s robustness against watermark overwriting attacks.
Dataset MNIST CIFAR-10 ImageNet (top-1)
Key Length K=20 K=30 K=50 K=20 K=30 K=50 K=20 K=30 K=50
Accuracy 99.46% 99.43% 99.38% 92.01% 92.09% 92.05% 56.24% 56.32% 56.38%
BER 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
Detection Success 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
TABLE V: Integrity evaluation of BlackMarks framework with various key lengths.
Dataset MNIST CIFAR-10 ImageNet
Unmarked Models M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6 M1 M2 M3 M4 M5 M6
BER
K=20 0.25 0.2 0.25 0.05 0.05 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.35 0.75 0.15 0.50 0.45 0.55 0.25 0.20 0.25
K=30 0.27 0.23 0.23 0.03 0.03 0.1 0.15 0.15 0.05 0.35 0.75 0.2 0.37 0.27 0.33 0.1 0.2 0.17
K=50 0.26 0.16 0.16 0.08 0.08 0.1 0.58 0.28 0.20 0.64 0.72 0.14 0.46 0.38 0.44 0.02 0.3 0.28
Fig. 4: BlackMarks’ robustness against parameter pruning. The key length is set to K = 50. The blue solid lines and orange
dashed lines denote the BER and final test accuracy, respectively.
after the model is fine-tuned for various numbers of epochs.
Note that the number of fine-tuning epochs for ImageNet
benchmark is smaller than the other two since the number of
epochs needed to train the ImageNet benchmark from scratch
is 70 whereas the other benchmarks take around 200 epochs
to be trained.
Parameter Pruning. We use the pruning approach proposed
in [28] to sparsify the weights in the target watermarked DNN.
To prune a specific layer, we first set α% of the parameters that
possess the smallest weight values to zero. The model is then
sparsely fine-tuned using cross-entropy loss to compensate for
the accuracy drop caused by pruning.
Figure 4 demonstrates the impact of pruning on WM
extraction. One can see that BlackMarks tolerates up to 95%,
80%, and 90% parameter pruning for MNIST, CIFAR-10, and
ImageNet benchmark, respectively. As illustrated in Figure 4,
in cases where DNN pruning yields a substantial BER value,
the sparse model suffers from a large accuracy drop. Therefore,
one cannot remove BlackMarks’ WM by excessive pruning
while attaining a comparable accuracy with the baseline.
Watermark Overwriting. Assuming the attacker is aware of
the watermarking methodology, he may attempt to corrupt the
original WM by embedding a new one. In our experiments,
we assume the adversary knows the targeted adversarial attack
method employed by the model owner while the owner’s
signature and the key generation parameters remain secret. In
this case, the attacker generates another set of WM keys with
his own signature and key generation parameters to fine-tune
the marked model following the steps outlined in Algorithm 1.
Table IV summarizes the accuracy of the overwritten DNN and
the BER of the original WM signature (K = 30,K = 50)
for all three benchmarks. In our experiments, we assume the
attacker uses the same key length as the owner to generate the
new WM keys. BlackMarks can successfully extract the orig-
inal WM in the overwritten DNN with zero BER, indicating
its credibility and robustness against WM overwriting attacks.
C. Security
The malicious adversary may try to find the exact WM
key designed by the model owner. Since the key generation
parameters and the WM signature are assumed to be secret in-
formation provided by the owner as discussed in Section IV-A,
even if the attacker is aware of the adversarial attack method
used to generate the WM key, he cannot reproduce the exact
same key images due to the large searching space. Therefore,
BlackMarks is secure against brute-force attacks. Note that
BlackMarks’s security derives from the uncertainties in the key
generation process. This is due to the fact that it is sufficient for
the attacker to disturb one bit in the recovered WM signature
to make the resulting BER non-zero, thus defeating the model
authorship proof.
D. Integrity
Integrity requires that the watermarking technique shall not
falsely claim the authorship of unmarked models. For multi-
bit watermarking, such requirement means that if an unmarked
model is queried by the owner’s WM key set, the BER between
the decoded signature from the model’s predictions and the
owner’s signature shall not be zero. To evaluate the integrity
of BlackMarks, we choose six unmarked models for each
TABLE VI: Robustness comparison between unmarked and marked models against adversarial attacks.
Accuracy on Adversarial Set MNIST CIFAR-10Unmarked Model Marked Model Unmarked Model Marked Model
FGSM (untargeted, [30]) 58.67% 75.03% 36.51% 36.93%
JSMA (targeted, [31]) 4.98% 10.20% 76.56% 77.21%
MIM (targeted, [18]) 59.24% 77.47% 53.97% 56.82%
CW (targeted, [32]) 87.50% 89.91% 43.03% 44.84%
Fig. 5: Normalized runtime ratio of BlackMarks’ WM embedding with different key lengths.
benchmark and summarize the results in Table V. The first
three models (M1-M3) have the same network topology but
different weights as the watermarked model and the other
three models (M4-M6) have different topologies as the marked
model. For each benchmark, the owner queries these six
unmarked models with her WM keys and tries to extract the
WM. The computed BER is non-zero in all cases, indicating
that BlackMarks avoids claiming the ownership of unmarked
DNNs and yields low false positive rates.
E. Capacity
One apparent advantage of BlackMarks over existing zero-
bit black-box watermarking methods is its higher capacity as
we discuss in Section II. To further improve the capacity of the
WM, BlackMarks can be easily generalized to embed more
complex signatures instead of binary vectors. The amount
of information carried by the owner’s WM signature can
be measured by entropy [33]. More generally, if the owner
specifies her signature (a numeric vector) with base B and
length K, the corresponding entropy can be computed as:
H = K · log2B (2)
As can be seen from Eq. (2), a longer signature with a larger
base value carries more information. Since we use a binary
vector (B = 2) as the WM signature in this paper, the
entropy can be simplified as H = K. To extend BlackMarks
framework for embedding a base-N signature, the owner needs
to set the number of components in K Means Clustering to
N (Algorithm 1) and change the encoding as well as decoding
scheme of predictions correspondingly. BlackMarks is the first
generic multi-bit watermarking framework that possesses high
capacity in the black-box setting.
F. Overhead
The WM extraction overhead is discussed in Section IV-C.
Here, we analyze the runtime overhead incurred by WM
embedding. Recall that the WM is inserted in the model by
one-time fine-tuning of the target DNN with the regularized
loss shown in Eq. (1). As such, the computation overhead to
embed a WM is determined by computing the additive loss
term LWM during DNN training. BlackMarks has no com-
munication overhead for WM embedding since the embedding
process is performed locally by the model owner. To quantify
the computation overhead for WM embedding, we measure the
normalized runtime time ratio of fine-tuning the pre-trained
model with the WM-specific loss and the time of training
the original DNN from scratch. To embed the WM, we use
the entire training data for MNIST and CIFAR-10 benchmark
and 10% of the training data for ImageNet benchmark in
our experiments. The selected training data is concatenated
with the WM key set to fine-tune the model. The results
are visualized in Figure 5, showing that BlackMarks incurs
a reasonable additional overhead for WM embedding (as low
as 2.054%) even for large benchmarks.
VI. DISCUSSION
Recall that WM embedding leverages a similar approach
as ‘adversarial training’ while incorporating a WM-specific
regularization loss (Section IV-A). Here, we study the effect of
WM embedding on the model’s robustness against adversarial
attacks. Table VI compares the robustness of the pre-trained
unmarked model and the corresponding watermarked model
(K = 50) against different types of white-box adversarial
attacks. It can be seen that for each type of the attack, the
marked model has higher accuracy on the adversarial samples
compared to the unmarked baseline. The largest accuracy
improvement is observed against MIM attacks, which is the
method employed by BlackMarks to generate WM keys. Such
improvement is intuitive to understand since during WM
embedding, the first term (cross-entropy loss) in the total
regularized loss (see Eq. (1)) enforces the model to learn the
correct predictions on training data as well as on the WM
keys (‘adversarial samples’), thus having a similar effect as
‘adversarial training’ [21]. Therefore, BlackMarks has a side
benefit of improving the model’s robustness against adversarial
attacks.
In the future, we plan to extend BlackMarks framework to
the multi-user setting for fingerprinting purpose. [34] present
the first collusion-resilient DNN fingerprinting approach for
unique user tracking in the white-box setting. To the best of
our knowledge, no black-box fingerprinting has been proposed
due to the lack of black-box multi-bit watermarking schemes.
BlackMarks proves the feasibility of black-box fingerprinting
methods and builds the technical foundation.
VII. CONCLUSION
Deep learning is facilitating breakthroughs in various fields
and being increasingly commercialized. A practical concern,
in the rush to adopt DL models as a service, is protecting
the models against IP infringement. In this paper, we pro-
pose BlackMarks, the first black-box multi-bit watermarking
framework for IP protection. To the best of our knowledge, this
work provides the first empirical evidence that embedding and
extracting multi-bit information using the model’s predictions
are possible. We introduce a set of requirements to characterize
the performance of an effective watermarking technique and
perform a comprehensive evaluation of BlackMarks accord-
ingly. Experimental results on various datasets and network
architectures corroborate that BlackMarks coherently embeds
robust watermarks in the output predictions of the target DNN
with an additional overhead as low as 2.054%. BlackMarks
possesses superior capacity compared to all existing zero-bit
watermarking techniques and paves the way for future black-
box fingerprinting techniques.
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